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# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

*An interpretation of current international events by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association*

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## WHAT KIND OF AGREEMENT WILL BIG THREE REACH ON GERMANY?

THE rapid progress of Russian armies in eastern Germany poses with new urgency the question of what the United Nations plan to do about the Reich following unconditional surrender—a question which will undoubtedly be at the top of the agenda of the Big Three conference. The European Advisory Commission set up by the Moscow Declaration of October 30, 1943 has been studying various aspects of the German problem in London for over a year, but its conclusions have not been made public. While it is certainly premature to figure, as some people are doing, on the approximate length of time it may take the Russians to capture Berlin, the fact remains that the future of Germany is no longer an academic question.

To what extent is it possible to say, in the absence of official information, that agreement about the future of Germany exists among the United States, Britain and Russia? There are five main issues to consider: territorial settlement; economic structure; reparation; post-war treatment of the German people; and international organization for security.

1. TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT. Unofficial opinion in the United States has on the whole opposed partition of Germany, with the notable exception of former Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles who, in *The Time for Decision*, advocates the division of Germany into three parts. In Britain, too, most organs of opinion have not favored partition, and the London *Economist* definitely came out against it on August 12, 1944, on the ground that a Carthaginian peace "would raise to a maximum the Germans' desire for revenge and reduce to a minimum the British and American willingness to uphold the settlement." The Soviet government, however, in its statement of January 20, 1944 concerning settlement of the controversy over eastern Poland on the basis of the Curzon Line, proposed that Poland should take, in compensation, certain

German territories extending to the Oder River, including East Prussia and Upper Silesia, and Russia is reported to want German territory on the Baltic, including Königsberg. Prime Minister Churchill, in his address to the House of Commons on December 15, 1944 said that the Poles are free, so far as Russia and Britain are concerned, "to extend their territories at the expense of Germany to the west," having previously stated that the Atlantic Charter, which bars territorial aggrandizement, does not apply to Germany.

In the West, General deGaulle has demanded that the important industrial regions of the Rhineland and the Ruhr be placed under the control of an international commission, of which France should be a member; and, more recently, that France should have access, possibly under international control, to the Westphalian coal fields. Dutch spokesmen have also declared that Germany should surrender border areas to Holland, in compensation for German flooding of Dutch areas—but this demand is not unanimously supported in Dutch government circles. The United States, so far, has given no official indication of its views on the partition of Germany. It should be pointed out that the reported plans of the European Advisory Commission for division of Germany into three areas, to be administered by the United States, Britain and Russia respectively, could conceivably become a precursor of partition if the Allied forces remain in occupation for a considerable period of time. This country is known to have a special interest in Austria, which is regarded as the dividing line between Russia and the Western powers; and there has been some talk of uniting Austria with Bavaria.

Many arguments can be advanced for and against the dismemberment of Germany. The guiding principle in reaching a decision should be neither thirst for revenge, nor sentimental consideration for the

feelings of the Germans (who will not regard with favor any peace signed following their defeat), but the need to reach a settlement that promises stability in Europe for the foreseeable future. The danger of the proposals made by Russia and France is that they have little chance of being supported for any length of time by the British and American people. Under the circumstances, the Poles and French could hold the German areas they want only with the military support of Russia, to whom they would become indebted to an extent that could constitute a far more direct threat to their independence than any amount of Communist propaganda. No territorial settlement in Europe will last unless it can be backed by the full force of an international organization which, to be effective, would have to include Britain and the United States.

2. **ECONOMIC STRUCTURE.** The only known proposal for "de-industrialization" of Germany is the so-called Morgenthau plan, which has not been published, and may have been misinterpreted in newspaper reports. Various unofficial suggestions have been made, however, to deprive Germany of the industrial potential necessary for modern warfare by eliminating industries specifically devoted to war purposes—such as synthetic rubber and oil, aluminum, and airplanes; and to establish international controls over the importation by Germany of raw materials it lacks, notably rubber, oil, copper, and so on. (The loss of East Prussia and Upper Silesia, and international control of the Ruhr and Westphalia would curtail Germany's coal resources, and would complicate its adaptation to a primarily agricultural life by depriving it of approximately 30 per cent of its rye, barley, potato and sugarbeet production.) The abolition of certain German industries that compete with those of Britain and the United States might find some support, especially among the British, who look to export trade after the war to restore their depleted economic resources. It might be opposed, on the one hand, by some businessmen in the Western world who, before the war, had established close relations with German industries, either through cartels or other arrangements; and, on the other, by the Russians, who have stated on occasion that the Germans must replace the tools and machinery they destroyed in Russia. The future of Germany's economic structure, in this respect, is closely linked to the question of reparation.

3. **REPARATION.** The British and Americans, recalling the innumerable difficulties of collecting reparation from Germany after World War I, do not appear eager to repeat the experience. The nations of Europe conquered by Hitler would certainly benefit by any reparation in kind the Germans could make for what they looted and destroyed, but so far most of them are disinclined to seek such reparation—

partly because they fear that large imports from Germany would lead to unemployment among their own workers, partly because they realize that, if Germany is to supply such reparation, its industries will have to be kept running, and perhaps even rebuilt, by the Allies, to the immediate advantage of the Germans. The Russians, as indicated above, may take a different view. But the chief emphasis of the Russians has been on reparation not in money or kind, but in labor and technical skill. Moscow has suggested that German workers and engineers should be set at the task of rebuilding the devastated areas of Russia, and have already sent Rumanians of German origin to work in those areas.

This proposal has shocked many Westerners, who fear that it would create slave labor. If it is accepted, it must be hoped that it will be applied under the supervision of an international commission. But the Russian proposal has three important points that deserve consideration. It would bring home to the Germans as no program of school re-education could possibly do, that war does not pay, and that what the Germans have destroyed they must literally repair. It would furnish employment to Germans who, as a result of disarmament and of any de-industrialization measures that may be adopted by the Allies, might otherwise be faced with mass unemployment. Finally, it would give Russia (and other devastated countries should they wish to follow Russia's example) an opportunity to rebuild ahead of Germany. The last point has greater significance than is usually realized in this country. For the primary objective of the Nazis was so to weaken the rest of Europe through systematic economic destruction and biologic restrictions as to insure that Germany, whatever fate it might suffer on the battlefield, would remain the paramount power on the continent.

4. **TREATMENT OF GERMANS.** Many people, hearing of Russia's proposal for the use of German labor, have jumped to the conclusion that the Russians would be more harsh toward the Germans than the British or Americans—and have even favored Russia's prior entrance into Germany to insure a "harsh" peace which Britain and the United States might be too "soft" to impose. This is by no means a foregone conclusion. The Soviet government has been very skillful in conveying to the Germans the idea that, once the Nazis have been shorn of power and Nazi "criminals" have been punished, the German people can expect decent treatment, and even retain the two prized institutions of private property and the army. In line with this policy the Free German Committee, established in Moscow in the early days of the war, with prominent German officers at its head, including Marshal von Paulus, captured at Stalingrad, has urged German soldiers to revolt against the Nazis. This Committee has the makings,

should Moscow want to use it, of a provisional German government in the areas occupied by the Russians. It is true that many Germans still fear Russia, and are haunted by dread of Communism. But the question may well be asked whether, by now, conditions of life in a city like Berlin, whose population has been driven to communal forms of housing and feeding to keep body and soul together, are essentially different from conditions in Russia. If Communism comes in Germany, it will have been fostered in the first place by the totalitarianism of the Nazis and by the war.

Britain and the United States have no committees of Germans to set up in the areas they are hoping to occupy, but General Eisenhower, in a series of proclamations to the German people, has promised abolition of Nazi laws and institutions, and guarantees of citizens' rights. Until recently, there had also appeared to be agreement between Britain, the United States and Russia concerning the punishment of Nazi "criminals." A stalemate, however, has been reached by the United Nations War Crimes Commission in London. The resignation of its British chairman, Sir Cecil Hurst, and its American member, Herbert C. Pell, reveal that disagreement arose both as to the prospect of bringing Nazi leaders before an international court of justice, and the possibility of trying German officials for their treatment of German citizens, notably German Jews. Russia, which

is not a member of the Commission, has taken the view that the punishment of Nazi "criminals" is a matter not of law, but of military policy.

5. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY. Whatever other measures may be taken by the United Nations concerning Germany, the fundamental issue remains the need for an international organization that could effectively check aggression by Germany or any other nation. The United States, Britain and Russia, in spite of many divergences on specific European problems, agree on the need for such an organization, and have taken preliminary steps to establish it by accepting the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. In his speech of November 6 on the twenty-seventh anniversary of the Soviet revolution, Stalin said that these proposals "should be regarded as one of the clear indications of the stability of the front against Germany." It is in the hope of maintaining this stability that President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill have accepted many developments in Europe with which they may not agree one hundred per cent—any more than Stalin feels one hundred per cent sure of the future aims of Britain and the United States. One of the main tasks of the Big Three conference will be to reduce the still existing area of mistrust, and pave the way for concerted action on Germany.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

## THE F.P.A. BOOKSHELF

*China's Wartime Politics, 1937-1944*, by Lawrence K. Rossinger. Issued under the auspices of the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations: Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1944. \$2.00

A timely and compact survey of the current Chinese political scene and its background, written by the FPA Research Associate on the Far East. An appendix contains fourteen important documents relating to the main issues of Chinese politics.

*How to End the German Menace; A Political Proposal by Five Hollanders*. New York, Querido, 1944. \$1.25

A detailed plan, similar to that proposed by Sumner Welles, for the partition of Germany into three or four separate and independent states.

*Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace*, by Thomas A. Bailey. New York, Macmillan, 1944. \$3.00

A critical analysis of the role Wilson played in international affairs from the outbreak of World War I through the Paris Peace Conference by a leading diplomatic historian.

*Military Occupation and the Rule of Law*, by Ernst Fraenkel. New York, Oxford University Press, 1944. \$3.50

At a time when the problem of occupation at the end of this war presses for solution, this careful study of the Rhineland occupation at the close of World War I is most valuable.

*Durable Peace: A Study in American National Policy*, by Ross J. S. Hoffman. New York, Oxford University Press, 1944. \$1.75

An interesting attempt to define a foreign policy which expresses our national tradition, yet is definitely against isolation.

*Constitutional Provisions Concerning Social and Economic Policy*. International Labour Office, Montreal, 1944. \$5.00

This collection of texts is designed to help countries which may revise their constitutions after the war. The introduction indicates objectives which will be important in formulating new constitutions.

*Poland and Russia: The Last Quarter Century*, by Ann Su Cardwell. New York, Sheed and Ward, 1944. \$2.75

An American resident in Poland for many years, and wife of the general director of the Polish Y.M.C.A., the author presents a view favorable to Poland.

*Germany, A Short History*, by George N. Shuster and Arnold Bergstraesser. New York, Norton, 1944. \$2.75


An attractively written survey of German history that takes a sympathetic attitude toward Germany's problems. In assigning responsibility for World War II the authors tend to hold Hitler rather than the German people responsible, arguing that the steps whereby he gained power were so masked that few Germans realized their import.

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# Washington News Letter



## MERIT NOT POLITICS SHOULD GOVERN DIPLOMATIC APPOINTMENTS

With the Army and Navy, the Foreign Service is one of the three shields of our national security, and Ambassadors should be chosen as carefully as generals and admirals. The foreign relations of the United States suffer whenever Ambassadorships are carelessly awarded as political consolation prizes. This issue, an old one, is raised anew by President Roosevelt's letter of January 20 dismissing Jesse Jones as Secretary of Commerce, in which the President said: "During the next few days I hope you will think about a new post—there are several ambassadorships which are vacant—or about to be vacated. I hope you will have a chance, if you think well of it, to speak to Ed [Stettinius]." However able an Ambassador Mr. Jones might prove to be should he accept the offer, such a casual reference to important diplomatic assignments cannot but lower the Foreign Service in public estimation.

**CAREFUL CHOICE OF AMBASSADORS.** The question is not whether politicians or ex-office holders should be appointed Ambassadors, but whether anybody should be appointed to such a post for political reasons unrelated to knowledge of foreign affairs. The practice of treating Ambassadorships as lame-duck havens robs the Foreign Service of the vigor, ability and *esprit de corps* which the development of an active foreign policy requires, and discourages the serious career diplomat in a subordinate position who sincerely wants to respect his chief of mission. At the same time, it encourages the public to take the frivolous view of foreign affairs depicted a few years ago in the play "Of Thee I Sing," in which a well-intentioned bumbler makes amusing errors in his earnest attempt to fill the role of Ambassador. The Administration needs broad popular support to achieve its objective of United States participation in an international security organization, and will be greatly hampered in obtaining it if it permits the conduct of our foreign relations to become a football of domestic politics.

In selecting Ambassadors the President serves the country best by finding qualified men, wherever they may be, to perform a particular job, and by treating seriously the search for such men. In earlier days, when it was popularly supposed that the United States was impervious to events abroad, the use of Ambassadorships as political rewards may have been sound, for in few instances could the shortcomings of an envoy have harmed our interests. Thus Abra-

ham Lincoln without a qualm sent Simon Cameron to the Court of St. James, not to improve our relations with Britain, but to save Cameron from attack for his poor administration of the War Department.

**CAREER MEN IN THE MAJORITY.** Today, however, the President, Congress and the nation recognize the great international responsibilities of the United States. Few Americans argue that we are invulnerable to events abroad or to the mistakes of our diplomats. Carelessness in the choice of diplomats will henceforth be downright dangerous. Recognition of the need for ability in diplomatic posts has been developing throughout this century. In the time of Woodrow Wilson the Executive ceased to award the posts of Consul and Attaché on a political basis, and the Foreign Service Act of 1924 has made possible the development of a stable career service under the administration of the State Department.

President Roosevelt currently relies on the career service to supply most of the Ambassadors and Ministers, but good Ambassadors do not necessarily come from that service. In its early history, the United States had no men formally trained in international relations, but did have diplomats of native ability like Benjamin Franklin. Such "naturals" have appeared in recent times as well. The late Dwight Morrow, a financier who was sent as Ambassador to Mexico in 1927, had a distinguished diplomatic record, although he did not reach his position through the Civil Service. John Winant, Ambassador to Great Britain, one of this country's wartime diplomats, was Governor of New Hampshire and Director of the International Labor Organization before his diplomatic appointment. In every case the President would be well advised to seek, first, among the career service to fill vacant Ministerial and Ambassadorial posts. As a general rule, however, our highest representatives abroad should at all times be chosen on merit and, where distinguished public servants like Jesse Jones or eminent private citizens are chosen, such choice should be made not on the basis of paying political debts, but for reasons of special ability for the task at hand. But the President will lack full freedom to choose the best possible men for all posts as long as the Ambassadorial salary remains \$17,500, for expenses of some of the most important posts often exceed the pay and allowances.

BLAIR BOLLES

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